Abstract. Future extreme-scale computer systems may expose silent data corruption (SDC) to applications, in order to save energy or increase performance. However, resilience research struggles to come up with useful abstract programming models for reasoning about SDC. Existing work randomly flips bits in running applications, but this only shows average-case behavior for a low-level, artificial hardware model. Algorithm developers need to understand worst-case behavior with the higher-level data types they actually use, in order to make their algorithms more resilient. Also, we know so little about how SDC may manifest in future hardware, that it seems premature to draw conclusions about the average case. We argue instead that numerical algorithms can benefit from a numerical unreliability fault model, where faults manifest as unbounded perturbations to floating-point data. Algorithms can use inexpensive "sanity" checks that bound or exclude error in the results of computations. Given a selective reliability programming model that requires reliability only when and where needed, such checks can make algorithms reliable despite unbounded faults. Sanity checks, and in general a healthy skepticism about the correctness of subroutines, are wise even if hardware is perfectly reliable.
Introduction
Much resilience research has focused on tolerating parallel process failures through standard techniques like checkpoint/restart (C/R) or process replication. The monster in the closet [12] is incorrect hardware behavior which does not cause process failure. Faults like incorrect arithmetic or memory corruption may make the application produce incorrect results or increase run time, with no indication from the system that something went wrong. We refer to this class of faults as silent data corruption (SDC). If systems cannot correct these faults before they affect applications' behavior, then the burden of tolerating them shifts to algorithms: either to detect abnormal behavior and correct it, or to "absorb" its effects while still making progress towards the correct solution. SDC's causes are poorly understood. Moreover, this type of fault is rare enough that it is difficult to observe [15] .
Resilience approaches used in daily practice, such as C/R, are attractive because they presume an abstract, minimal fault model. C/R assumes only that checkpoints contain correct state, and are stored reliably to stable (shared, nonvolatile) storage. It does not care whether the application failed due to a crashed node, network errors, a power outage, or the job running out of allocation time. This abstract fault model lets C/R recover from many different kinds of faults.
SDC, by definition, does not trigger system actions like a restart. The silent error can manifest in several ways, such as performance variation between parallel processes, convergence to a wrong solution, or even an application crash sufficiently long after a checkpoint is written that contains the tainted state. Given the success of C/R's abstract fault model, why then has soft error research focused so heavily on a low-level, fine-grained "bit flip" fault model? Bits may go wrong if an error is introduced, but this does not help us design algorithms which work at a much higher abstraction layer than bits. Applications care about data types like floating-point values and integers, not about the bits which compose them.
We argue that resilient numerical methods should be designed around an abstract fault model of numerical unreliability, in much the same way C/R is designed around an abstract model of system unreliability. We present a case for a radically different research methodology that merges numerical analysis with systems fault tolerance, and provides algorithm developers with programming models they can use to ensure correctness despite SDC. We solicit this community specifically, because this challenge requires researchers that are comfortable bridging mathematics and computer science.
Bit Flips for Algorithm Analysis?
All prior work in fault-tolerant numerical methods, including some of ours, has presumed a bit flip model of hardware faults. That is, faults occur randomly (e.g., via a Poisson process), and manifest as one or more bits of one or more words changing values ("flipping"). That word could store data of any type, including floating-point values, integer indices, pointers, or even instructions. A fault itself does not immediately cause the affected process to crash, except through any resulting changes to application behavior, such as a segmentation violation signal raised due to an illegal memory access caused by a corrupted pointer.
This model is seductive, because it lets researchers apply a "computer science" approach to numerical algorithms. In particular, it allows stochastic sampling. That is, for a given problem, one either randomly [2-5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 18, 21] or exhaustively [8, 10] flips bits and observes the effects on running codes. This makes for reasonable papers: One picks some numerical algorithm (e.g., an iterative linear solver), a set of test problems, and fires them off with some random fault injection in the background. The authors may also engineer a technique that detects and corrects the faults being injected.
We argue against this approach. First, we have no idea if real hardware faults manifest in this way, either in current or future computers. Second, stochastic sampling tends to reveal average-case behavior, but we are most interested in worst-case behavior. Third, the bit flip model does not reflect what algorithms actually need to know, in order to increase their resiliency. That is, simply pointing out that a bit flip can cause the algorithm to stagnate, produce a comically wrong solution, or, if lucky, get the right answer does not enable us to design algorithms any wiser than we did prior to the study. What this type of research does accomplish, is that it shows that certain fault models can be addressed via specific engineering approaches, e.g., checksums.
Bit Flip Model May Not Reflect Actual Hardware Behavior
Bit flips can manifest all sorts of problems, from corrupting arithmetic results or storage to changing the instruction stream. There are too many ways in which things could go wrong, so it's not clear where to start predicting behavior. For example, what happens if data in a cache are corrupted? It depends on whether the algorithm reads or writes the corrupted data, as well as the cache eviction policy. It is also not clear whether possible future hardware which lets faults through to applications will behave according to our models. We barely even know how to program future fault-free hardware.
Future architectures may need to expose more unreliability to save energy or improve performance. The question is what level of unreliability a numerical technique can handle. We can make progress towards this answer by focusing on research on algorithms that bound error, rather than attempting to detect and correct all errors. We explain this in the following sections.
Worst-Case Behavior: Adversarial vs. Practitioner
Stochastic sampling is a natural tool to use given the bit flip model. Random sampling, in itself, is not bad, but as a means to justify the correctness of a numerical method it is inadequate. Numerical methods typically have proven behavior and correctness. If operations can be unreliable, then we need to identify the bounds in which a resilient algorithm is reliable. That is, we should understand the smallest and largest errors we may commit. Relying on sampling alone leaves us prone to a practitioner design pattern, where things are fixed only when someone (or a sample) identifies there is a problem. We feel a more adversarial approach is required, and this approach fits naturally with a bounded error design methodology. For a given numerical kernel, we wish to know the worst-case error that can be committed, and with this knowledge, we can employ pure and applied mathematicians to aid us in designing methods that can tolerate such error bounds.
When developing an algorithm, we cannot ignore the extreme cases, because if we do so, we have unstated assumptions about the way in which the algorithm can be used. For numerical methods, unstated assumptions make the method nearly worthless, given that we can never anticipate what combinations of data the user will throw at the algorithm. For this reason we advocate moving from a bit flip model to a more abstract model that evaluates algorithms based on their ability to absorb unexpected numerical variability.
Large Perturbations and Boundedness
The "random bit flip" fault model does not reflect what algorithms actually need to know. Algorithm developers do not care whether a network packet dumped garbage into our reduction or a cosmic ray blasted 20 entries in an array. All of these events can be modeled as numeric perturbations in the algorithm. Furthermore, we can bound these errors by detecting their effects. Then we can use numerical approaches that can tolerate "large" errors, where "large" means "much larger than rounding error, but not large enough to detect."
Our training leads us to restrict our consideration to numerical algorithms, that is, approximations for the solution of continuous problems using floatingpoint numbers. Other authors have studied ways to make discrete algorithms (like sorting) more fault tolerant, by relaxing them into continuous problems [20] . Mathematics has a long history of analyzing the effects of perturbations to the input or intermediate results of numerical algorithms. Usually, those perturbations are small and represent the effects of rounding error or the limited accuracy of experimental data. However, analysis has shown that some algorithms can tolerate errors of size comparable to the input data (see e.g., inexact Krylov [19] ). We are mainly interested in worst-case behavior, so we can exclude small errors, because those are already covered by rounding error analysis.
Under our abstract model of numerical unreliability and in conjunction with bounds, then we know the worst-case faults lie within our bounds. This approach gives us a clear research direction that we feel will prove extremely useful. By analyzing algorithm's behavior to "large" perturbations within the algorithms theoretical bounds, we can use analysis and experimentation to identify the worst-case faults.
What About Metadata?
One might question whether it suffices just to consider floating-point arithmetic and storage. Numerical algorithms do not only have data, they also have metadata: Pointers, indices, program counters, and even the instructions themselves. We consider data to be the state required theoretically by the numerical method, e.g., a Krylov subspace K, an input matrix A, a right-hand side vector. The metadata is the information required to implement the method, like integer dimensions n, loop counters i, and sparse matrix indices. Some metadata may occupy space proportional to the data. For example, with many sparse matrix storage formats, indices take space proportional to that of the matrix's values. Does it make sense to consider data corruption, without including the metadata?
We should always apply research effort in the most extensible way possible. A numerical algorithm like the method of conjugate gradients can be implemented in many ways, but its theoretical foundation will remain the same. That is to say, the data as well as certain invariant properties can be assumed a priori, and we can harden the algorithms by devising mechanisms to assert that these theoretical principals remain true. The metadata required to implement the algorithm can change drastically based on who implements the algorithm, and the language or libraries chosen to do so. We will expand this thought in the subsequent section.
There are three possible effects of metadata corruption. First, it could manifest as a floating-point data fault. For example, a corrupted array index would result in a read of the wrong value. Second, it could crash the process, for example due to a segmentation violation or an invalid instruction. Third, it could be possible for metadata corruption to let the process keep running, but put it in an undefined, unpredictable state.
3 Experience suggests that the third option is exceptionally unlikely. Furthermore, the second case reduces to the known problem of process failure. An entire genre of research and practical software exists to handle this case. Sometimes the first case gets turned into the second, for example ECC memory when it detects an error it cannot correct.
We can only argue about what to do for data faults, not whether exposing data faults is a good idea. If systems do expose faults to applications, the metadata issue will arise.
Numerical Unreliability and Skeptical Programming
If we assume that operations are inherently unreliable, then we should anticipate events such as 2 + 2 = 0. One approach to tolerate numerical unreliability, is to detect and correct all errors. This is what traditional Application-Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) [14] has done. ABFT methods propagate checksums throughout an algorithm and use these checksums to assert that computations are correct. This approach is daunting, as the burden to detect and correct all numerical errors is difficult and an open area for research, even for well understood numerical methods such as LU decomposition [4] . We advocate a different strategy.
Traditional ABFT attempts to preserve the illusion of an always reliable machine. Instead, we favor an approach more compatible with numerical analysis. First, we bound the error that faults can introduce. Second, we identify methods that can tolerate the largest error possible. This strategy is based entirely on the algorithm theory and the data itself. That is, given specific inputs, we can bound large portions of an algorithm using standard norm bounds and inner product bounds. These bounds enforce that errors committed in intermediate computations do not exceed the theoretical limit imposed by the algorithm in conjunction with the data provided. We demonstrate this approach in [9] and a similar approach is used in [22] .
Because operations are unreliable (numerical unreliability), the bounds allow us to be skeptical of key values. We use a bound on orthogonal projections in [9] , while Van Dam et al. use a bound on a crucial inner product [22] . These bounds work as filters rather than error detectors. We make no promise to detect and correct all errors, we merely promise bounded error. We refer to this approach as Skeptical Programming.
Numerical research provides a continuous stream of results that could be used in our Skeptical Programming strategy. The key factor is that these bounds be 1) cheap to evaluate, and 2) be determined before the algorithm is run. We prefer to determine these bounds a priori because numerical unreliability may affect any bound computed inside the algorithm. That is, if we allow a bound to depend on unreliable computation, then the bound becomes unreliable as well. We may have to relax (2) in some cases, but we desire (1) to be true always. We clarify this reasoning by introducing Selective Reliability.
Selective Reliability
Hoemmen and Heroux proposed a fault tolerance approach based on the concept of isolating numerical operations that must be reliable, from those where reliability can be relaxed [1] . They use this to develop a programming model that "sandboxes" unreliable computations, and promises reliability on specific computations. A realization of Selective Reliability is the two-level iterative solver FT-GMRES. FT-GMRES preconditions Flexible GMRES (FGMRES) by GM-RES, possibly with its own preconditioner. The outer FGMRES iteration is identified as needing reliability, while the inner GMRES (and its preconditioner) is marked as suitable for unreliability. In this setup, the outer iteration absorbs the error introduced from numerical unreliability, while still making progress towards the correct solution.
Skeptical Programming enhances Selective Reliability by bounding the error that the inner (nested) GMRES solver can introduce. This approach allows the inner solver to run without expensive fault tolerance checks, such as frequently re-checking orthogonality or computing the explicit residual.
The key is that Selective Reliability does not describe what can be unreliable. Instead, it only declares what must be reliable. This approach enables phenomenal flexibility. For example, a reliable FGMRES outer solver, can wrap complicated (black box) preconditioners, while still promising that if a solution is obtained it will be correct. This approach is in stark contrast to current trends in fault tolerant algorithms, where algorithm developers are attempting to robustify every numerical method to handle faults.
Conclusions
The resilience community has almost no idea how SDC will manifest in future computers. We just know that it may show up. Thus, we aim to suggest models and best practices for algorithm developers, that assume as little as possible about how faults appear. Thinking of SDC as unbounded perturbations to floating-point data, rather than bit flips, describes it in a way useful to numerical analysts.
An easy way to start using this model, is to introduce inexpensive "sanity checks" that help bound or exclude incorrect results. These checks are never a bad idea, because they can protect code against many conditions other than SDC. These include violated assumptions about the input (e.g., that the matrix is nonsingular), rounding error that unexpectedly violates physical constraints such as energy conservation, and software bugs. Algorithm experts are the right people to design these checks. They should favor checks that can reduce error while bounding or measuring it. This includes iterative refinement for solving linear systems [6] , along with other inner-outer iterations like FT-GMRES. Algorithms with bounded error, such as regularized least squares instead of LU with partial pivoting, make good building blocks for constructing more resilient applications.
Combining these recommendations with a selective reliability programming model will let applications prove correctness. Even without selective reliability, implementing these recommendations should increase their resilience to SDC, as well as to other kinds of events that applications already encounter on today's hardware.
